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Competition in Farm Product Markets: Do Long-Run Incentives Trump Short-Run 
Market Power? 
Introduction 
Market structure and competition in U.S. agricultural markets have long been important topics 
for researchers and policymakers, with the red-meat packing industry representing a key focus 
dating back as far as 1919 when the U.S. Federal Trade Commission investigated the so-called 
“big five” processing firms and issued a critical report, accusing the industry of manipulating 
markets, restricting throughput, harming producers and consumers, and eliminating competition 
(Myers, Sexton, and Tomek 2010). Focus shifted in the mid 20th Century to investigating the 
power of food manufacturers and sometimes retailers over food consumers using the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) methodology. Influential books by Connor et al. (1985) and Marion 
(1986) summarized much of this work. 
However, soon after these books came into print, interest in the SCP paradigm began to 
wane.  As documented by Bonanno and Brandolini (1990), economists found the SCP paradigm 
increasingly unsuitable for incorporating many of the new theories in economics examining firm 
interactions and strategies at the micro level, specifically theories about product differentiation, 
endogenous entry barriers, collusion, information asymmetries, and vertical interactions along 
the marketing chain. Agricultural economists began using structural empirical models based 
upon the framework of the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) to obtain quantitative 
estimates of departures from competition in markets for farm product procurement and/or 
downstream sales. The advent of the NEIO thus saw the profession giving similar attention to 
market intermediaries’ power as upstream buyers of raw farm commodities as to their power 
downstream as sellers of intermediate or final products. 
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With food budgets for the average U.S. consumer now comprising less than 10% of 
disposable income, and the market entry and rise to dominance of discount grocery retailers such 
as Walmart, the policy and research focus on food manufacturers’ and retailers’ potential 
oligopoly power over consumers has faded. It has been replaced by a persistent policy concern 
about food processors’, handlers’, and occasionally retailers’ potential market power as buyers of 
farm commodities and the impact such power might have on the future of small farms and the 
viability of rural America. This concern has been manifest in provisions debated for inclusion in 
the 2002, 2008, and 2012 farm bills, stand-alone legislation—some of it currently active, 
regulations proposed under the Packers and Stockyards Act, and a well-publicized set of 
listening sessions conducted jointly in 2010 by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Justice 
on agricultural market competition and regulation. 
The concerns about buyer power in agriculture have been triggered by increases over 
time in concentration within all sectors of the food-marketing chain, which have consolidated 
purchases in the hands of ever fewer buying firms, as well as a rapid escalation in the degree of 
vertical control exercised in farm product markets through various forms of contracts and 
upstream vertical integration. Although considerable research has documented the efficiency-
enhancing effects of vertical coordination, the worry is that it may be used as a device to 
consolidate and extend buyers’ market power, and that it usually works to the detriment of 
smaller farmers. Theoretical and empirical economic research has yielded ambiguous 
conclusions on these points and done little to quell concerns. Angst about buyer power and a 
disparate impact on smaller farms feeds ultimately into broader issues concerning declining 
vitality of rural America through loss of economic activity and depopulation. 
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The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of buyer market power in modern farm 
product procurement markets. Although our explicit focus is on the U.S., the evolutionary forces 
in agricultural markets that have precipitated the ongoing concerns are a worldwide phenomenon. 
We develop a point raised by Sexton (2013, in press) in an Agricultural and Applied Economics 
Association Presidential address that buyer power concerns may be overstated in many 
agricultural industries because traditional models of buyer market power are incapable of 
depicting the economic interactions that are fundamental to modern agricultural markets. Our 
hope is that this present piece will spur an important and timely discussion among those 
economists who study the structure of food and agricultural industries.   
In what follows we first provide updated information on the evolution of concentration 
and vertical coordination in agricultural industries and argue that the available data are inherently 
limited in their ability to communicate a clear picture regarding procurement markets for farm 
products. We then discuss empirical evidence on competition and market power in farm product 
procurement, including descriptive evidence showing that a primary concern among farmers is 
the lack of competition among buyers to procure their production. We argue, however, that the 
logical inference made from such observations, namely that lack of competition is associated 
with buyer market power, may well be incorrect in modern markets where exchange is governed 
by stable contractual relationships among buyers and farmers. Further, policy proposals 
grounded in the presumed linkage between concentration, competition, and market power may 
well be misguided and detrimental to the objectives proponents seek to advance. 
Such erroneous inferences could emerge from applying a standard short-run model of 
monopsony or oligopsony power to the prototype highly concentrated procurement market, a 
model that in our view is increasingly incapable of characterizing interactions between farmers 
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and downstream buyers in an ever-increasing number of markets. A standard short-run model of 
buyer market power is based upon buyers recognizing their power to influence price and, 
accordingly, reducing their volume of purchases relative to the competitive level to lessen the 
input price and increase profits. In such cases farm prices and profits are reduced below the 
competitive level that is necessary to sustain resources in the industry, thus leading to exit and 
reduced productive capacity. This outcome, we argue, is inimical to the long-run interests of 
buyers of the farm product. Whereas this effect would largely be an externality in a prototype 
oligopsony model, it is internalized by buyers in a modern agricultural market characterized by 
contract production and long-term relationships between buyers and sellers. In short, buyers with 
long-run horizons are motivated by simple self interest not to exercise their short-run buyer 
power due to the long-run adverse consequences. 
Structure of Markets for Procurement of Farm Products  
Procurement markets for raw agricultural products have important structural attributes that 
distinguish them from many non-agricultural manufacturing industries. Rogers and Sexton (RS, 
1994) delineated four characteristics that in their view were key to defining agricultural-product 
procurement markets relative to prototype input markets. Table 1 reproduces this list. RS argued 
that these characteristics alone or in combination can lead to “compelling structural evidence of 
buyer market power” (1994, p. 1144). They called into question the conventional wisdom of the 
time that “monopsony power can be analyzed readily using the tools of monopoly power 
analysis” (1994, p. 1144), and urged the profession to pay closer attention to the issues of buyer 
power as opposed to seller power because of important distinctions in the two sides of the market. 
RS point 1 was that farm products are often bulky and perishable with relatively high 
shipping costs and hence relevant procurement markets that are narrower in geographic scope 
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than markets for the finished products.  Likewise, point 2 argues that farm inputs are narrower in 
product-characteristic scope than the finished products they produce and processors have very 
specific input needs that permit few if any substitutes.  RS remind the profession, point 3, that 
farmers have specialized assets that create a barrier to exit, making farm supply inelastic (and, 
hence, vulnerable potentially to exploitation through buyer power) and, point 4, institutions of 
seller power such as cooperatives often exist in input markets and might counterbalance buyer 
power. 
We have no quarrel with these four points, but argue that RS failed to consider essential 
characteristics of the buyers of agricultural products in arriving at their conclusions. In particular, 
processors of agricultural inputs also have enormous sunk costs in both equipment but also in 
their developed product lines and brands that make them as reliant upon the producers for 
consistent product quality and volume as the producers are to them to provide a market outlet. 
Just as geography may inhibit immobile agricultural products from traveling in search of better 
selling opportunities, so, too, do they restrict a geographically immobile processing facility’s 
ability to procure raw product from long distances. Thus, whereas a single buyer facing many 
sellers may have the ability to extract monopsony rents in the short run, its long-run interests in 
preserving supplies of an essential input may well trump the short-run profit maximization 
objective emphasized in traditional market power models. 
Second, just as farmers have very inelastic supply curves in the short run, we argue that 
buyers’ input demand functions for farm products are highly inelastic due to any of several 
factors that are likely to characterize in some combinations most modern agricultural markets. 
They include fixed capacity of processing facilities, fixed downstream selling contracts for 
finished products, and fixed access to retail shelf space. These structural attributes of modern 
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agricultural markets are seldom considered but in our view are key forces determining buyers’ 
procurement practices and the extent to which they “compete” for farmers’ production. 
Industry Trends: Concentration  
A key factor motivating angst among farmers has been the secular trend toward increasing 
concentration among agricultural market intermediaries and the attendant implications for 
farmers’ selling opportunities. RS examined concentration statistics from the 1987 Census of 
Manufactures for fifty-three food and tobacco industries identified by the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code.  As SIC codes expand from four-digit to six- and seven-digit 
formulations (increasingly fine tuning industry definitions), the national concentration of the 
largest firms representing the greatest share of sales value increases.  RS selected from these 
categories and showed how the five- and seven-digit classifications had an average four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4) of 61.3 “with twenty-four of the thirty-eight national product markets 
having CR4 > 50, a commonly used benchmark at the time for separating markets into workable 
competition and noncompetitive groups” (1994, p. 1144).   
 The Census of Manufactures abandoned the SIC classification, replacing it with the 
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) in 1997.  In the new quinquennial 
reports, the finest reported delineation of an industry is the six-digit NAICS code.  The six-digit 
NAICS codes covering the food manufacturing industry are presented in table 2, which shows 
the 2007 values (the latest year available) for the key industry variables of number of firms, total 
value of shipments, four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), as well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI), which RS did not report.  Relative to CR4, HHI is usually considered a better 
measure of concentration because it weights the concentration by firm shares of sales in a 
manner that gives more weight to larger firms than does the CR4. 1  The Federal Trade 
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Commission (FTC) uses the HHI as part of its mergers and acquisitions guidelines.  Table 2 also 
shows the percentage changes in each of these values since the 1997 Census, thus providing a 
reference for how industry structures have changed in the last decade.  
 The bottom of table 2 includes some simple statistics to compare with those of RS, with 
the caveat that we are comparing the NAICS to the SIC.  Whereas RS (1994, p. 1144) note that 
by 1987, “most industries have experienced decreasing firm numbers and increasing seller 
concentration over time,” the decade from 1997 to 2007 shows stabilization in food 
manufacturing with an average firm exit of just one percent at the six-digit NAICS level. While 
half of all industries have seen at least four firms leave, with some industries having faced 
extremely large numbers of firm closures (for example, 53% of sugarcane mills have shuttered), 
there have been roughly just as many new firms opening over the decade (for example, there 
were 58% more soybean processors in 2007 than a decade ago). 
 Overall, the average CR4 and HHI in 2007 for the food manufacturing industries were 
50.3 and 1,048, respectively. Under the FTC guidelines, horizontal mergers of firms would likely 
be approved for industries with HHI below 1,000.  Among 47 NAICS industries in table 2, 25 
meet this criterion.2 Mergers receive a great deal more scrutiny when the HHI is above 1,800. 
Nine NAICS industries in this table have concentrations above this threshold. The largest is 
NAICS industry 311422, specialty canning, where HHI = 2,885. 3  The greatest increase in 
concentration from 1997-2007 came in fluid milk (311511) and seafood canning (311711), 
industries where the HHI increased by 426 and 266 percent, respectively.  The largest decreases 
in concentration were in the chocolate confectionary (311320) and flour mixes and dough 
(311822) manufacturing sectors, where the HHI fell by 50 and 47 percent, respectively. 
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 Interestingly, two of the NAICS industry codes receiving the greatest scrutiny for market 
power, non-poultry animal slaughtering (311611) and poultry slaughtering (311615), have CR4s 
of 59.4 and 45.7, respectively, and the HHI has actually dropped by 2 percent since 1997 in non-
poultry animal slaughtering. These statistics, however, mask important differences in considering 
market power in the selling as opposed to the buying side of the market and illustrate the perils 
of relying on national indices to make inferences about concentration and market power.  First, 
sales (which the concentration figures examine) concern markets that are national and often 
international in scope.  Procurement markets for agricultural products, on the other hand, are 
often of more limited geography, as RS (1994) noted.  While the FTC might consider an HHI in 
non-poultry animal slaughtering of 1,047 to be at its threshold for merger approval if the FTC 
equated this NAICS code to a relevant product market, what we do not see in table 2 is the 
relevant concentration in the procurement markets for the agricultural product input.  Further, 
both beef and pork processing are subsumed in the same NAICS industry.  All meats are 
arguably competing products in the minds of consumers, but hogs are not a substitute for cattle 
in the processing stage.  In other words, what statistics in the Census of Manufactures cannot 
report is the relevant concentration in the purchasing of inputs, which is the real concern of farm 
producers and, increasingly, of policy makers.   
 The U.S. Department of Agriculture, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA) reports finer details on CR4 (but not the HHI) for the livestock 
industries, allowing a somewhat clearer picture of procurement markets to emerge.  Table 3 
shows the national CR4 for industries involved in the processing of steers and heifers, sheep and 
lambs, hogs, broilers, and turkeys from 1980 to 2010—classifications that represent at least 
relevant product markets for procurement, if not relevant geographic markets. From 1980 to 
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2010, four-firm concentration in these meat packing industries has increased an average of 69 
percent, with the largest increases occurring in steer and heifer packing (an increase of 136 
percent from a CR4 in 1980 of 36 to a CR4 of 85 in 2010) and hog packing (an increase of 91 
percent from a CR4 of 34 in 1980 to a CR4 of 65 in 2010). 
Most of this increase in concentration occurred in the 1980s. The fifteen years from 1980 
to 1995 saw the biggest changes in concentration occurring in steer and heifer processing with a 
125 percent increase in CR4. The next highest increase is in broiler processing, with a 44 percent 
rise in CR4 from 32 to 46. Over the next fifteen years, however, steer and heifer concentration 
remained virtually unchanged, with the CR4 increasing only 5 percent from 81 to 85 between 
1995 and 2010. Concentration in hog processing still went up by 41 percent, while the CR4 in 
sheep and lamb processing actually declined 10 percent over this time period. Broiler and turkey 
processing concentration has increased over the time period, but at a much lower rate than hogs.  
Without a time series of statistics on HHI for the relevant procurement markets, it is hard to tell, 
but quite plausible, that most of the slowdown in mergers, and, hence, the recent stability in 
concentration in these industries is simply due to them bumping against thresholds that trigger 
federal merger scrutiny.4 
Many food manufacturers operate multiple processing facilities, and a much less 
discussed point is the role of individual plants in fostering competition in procurement markets 
and the fact that number of plants has been declining along with increases in concentration due to 
mergers and acquisitions. In a study of the Texas Panhandle cattle-feeding region, Crespi and 
Sexton (2005) found that the number of plants had a greater impact on pricing than the number 
of firms.  
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Given the regional nature of livestock purchases, plant-closing decisions by large multi-
plant firms can greatly influence the nature of competition in these markets. Table 4 shows that 
over the same time period that concentration has increased, the number of slaughter facilities for 
cattle, hogs, and lamb and sheep has declined dramatically.   Although increasing concentration 
seems to have leveled in recent years, as shown in table 3, not so the number of plant closings. 
From 1980 to 2010, an average of 75 percent of the U.S. slaughter facilities for beef, pork and 
lamb that report to the Packers and Stockyards Program closed. Most of these closures (around 
55 percent) occurred from 1980 to 1995 but an average of 21 percent closed between 1995 and 
2010.  Comparing tables 3 and 4, for example, in the case of cattle, we see that, whereas CR4 
increased only 5 percent from 1995 to 2010, cattle slaughter facilities declined by 29 percent or 
144 fewer facilities. As one cattle producer summarized, 
While potentially there are four market participants, what we see typically region 
by region is that there are really one to two meaningful participants, rarely three, 
and four meaningful participants is very much of an oddity. -- Bruce Cobb, 
General Manager, Consolidated Beef Producers, Canyon Texas.  
The argument that the facilities that remain following plant closures are larger and can 
absorb the capacity from shuttered plants neglects the regional impacts and the ever-increasing 
importance of shipping costs in defining regional procurement markets. From 1995 to 2010, as 
plants closed, the prices of all goods (as measured by the CPI) increased by 36 percent or 
roughly two percent per year, but the price of gasoline increased by 145 percent (nine percent per 
year) and number 2 diesel increased by 170 percent (11 percent per year). Even if in principle a 
feedlot could send cattle an extra 500 miles to a processor offering a better price than the 
feedlot’s nearby buyer, the cost of doing so (both in terms of shipping costs per se, as well as the 
loss in product value that occurs typically in transit) creates feedlot dependency on the local 
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buyer. So, too, however, is there a similar dependency on the buyer’s part to feedlots proximate 
to its processing facility. 
Industry Trends: Vertical Coordination and Contracts 
Today’s consumers demand a wide variety of food choices, safe food, and nutritious food. And 
the share of average income now devoted to food has reached a point where so many can afford 
to be even more demanding in terms of the attributes of the foods they consume.  To meet the 
diverse demands of billions of consumers, the marketing chain, while becoming more global, has 
necessarily become more coordinated.   
The ever-greater vertical coordination between producers and highly concentrated market 
intermediaries is reflected through increased use of contract exchange mechanisms and 
decreasing use of cash markets. These trends are a great concern to many producers and their 
advocates in Congress and state legislatures. Contracts governed at least 39 percent of the value 
of U.S. agricultural production in 2008, up from 28 percent in 1991 and nearly four times the 11 
percent recorded in 1969 (MacDonald and Korb 2011).  
 The rate of increase in vertical coordination through contracts has been most pronounced 
in the U.S. in the livestock sector, where the share of cattle marketed under vertical coordination 
mechanisms doubled between 1980 and 1998 from about 10 percent to more than 20 percent. 
The pace of vertical coordination has accelerated rapidly since then, with negotiated cash 
procurement accounting for only 34.1 percent of cattle transactions in 2009-10 (Ward 2010), 
with additional declines occurring since then. Even in the early 1990s nearly 90 percent of hogs 
were purchased in the spot market, but by 2010, the percent of spot market hogs had fallen to the 
5-7 percent range, with 68 percent acquired through production contracts (Lawrence 2010, 
O’Donoghue et al. 2011), and a fourth acquired via integrated facilities owned by processors.  
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Combining marketing and production contracts, based on the value of the commodity, some 60.2 
percent of the contract agriculture is in livestock based on 2008 data, with crops accounting for 
the remaining 39.8 percent. Corn, with 10.8 percent of value is the most important contracted 
crop (MacDonald and Korb 2011). 
 
Lack of Competition in Farm Product Procurement and Traditional Buyer Market Power 
Farmers, legislators, regulators, and economists alike have voiced concerns about lack of 
competition in farm-product procurement, most notably in the livestock sector (MacDonald and 
McBride 2009). Farmers’ concerns about lack of buyers for their products was a key theme in 
the Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement, as illustrated in the summary provided 
by the DOJ: 
A consistent complaint was that, at various stages of the food chain, there are only 
a handful (if that many) of buyers or sellers, resulting in a lack of options for 
producers and lower prices for their commodities or higher prices for supplies. 
Producers often contrasted today’s concentrated markets with atomized markets 
of the past years, recalling times when they had plentiful trading partners (DOJ 
2012, pp. 5-6). 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack described the lack of selling opportunities for 
farmers this way: “Over the years, as I have traveled around the country, I have heard that there 
is an increasing concern that there are, essentially, fewer buyers to do business with and that 
some are saying that producers or feeders have a hard time getting bids or contracts for their 
livestock” (Livestock Industry Workshop 2010, 63: 16-21). The paucity of competition among 
buyers was said to create situations “…where feedyards are getting one bid, one bidder. They 
only get one person who calls on them from one company. They sell their cattle to one place, 
whether they’re in the cash market or not, and that’s because they have one opportunity” 
(Livestock Industry Workshop 2010, 224: 16-24). 
	 13
Responding to these sentiments and to a mandate contained in the 2008 Farm Bill, GIPSA 
proposed regulations in 2010 that would have significantly altered the way livestock and poultry 
processors conducted business.	 The goal of the USDA in promulgating these regulations in the 
words of Edward M. Avalos, Undersecretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, was to  
. . . improve fairness and transparency in marketing of livestock and poultry . . . 
What is driving the need to use [GIPSA’s] authority under the Packers and 
Stockyards Act is our concern about the loss of farmers and the depopulation of 
rural America (p. 27). 
The proposed regulations drew thousands of comments from producers, processors, and 
others. Many farmers expressed concerns over the small number of buyers for their livestock. 
Many farmers and farmer advocates supported the proposed regulations but others argued that 
the proposed restrictions on contracting would exacerbate matters in essence by causing 
processors to achieve needed vertical coordination through integration. For example, a Michigan 
pork producer asserted that the proposed rule would “…force more concentration and 
consolidation in the pork industry. It will drive packers to produce more of their own hogs, 
reducing their need for hogs from producers like me” (Taylor 2010).  
 Contract growers in the poultry industry also communicated the lack of buyers in their 
industry when recounting that, after being terminated by one integrator, they were unable to 
switch to another (Poultry Industry Workshop 2010, 137: 3-11). Growers believe that “[t]he lack 
of competition in a given geographic region has led to integrators with all the power, this leaves 
the grower with little to no choice” (Poultry Industry Workshop 2010, 167: 3-10).  
 Although the dairy industry in the U.S. is characterized by a regulated pricing structure 
and farmer cooperatives marketing the majority of the milk produced in the nation, dairy 
producers echoed concerns over the paucity of buyers in the Dairy Industry Workshop. Assistant 
Attorney General Christine Varney summarized them: “we know that dairy farmers are 
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concerned about a lack of choices for buyers and about the way that their milk is priced…” 
(Dairy Industry Workshop 2010, 15: 17-20).5 
	 Yet, despite the consistent refrain among farmers regarding the paucity of buyers in their 
geographic region and the extent to which the available buyers actually engage in direct 
competition, the NEIO literature on buyer power has not found the presence of significant 
oligopsony power. Early empirical estimates suggested that, after technology-induced 
consolidation had occurred, distortions in prices paid by processors for cattle were only about 
one percent of the cattle price and had been decreasing as beef processing became more 
concentrated (Schroeter 1988). Subsequent studies found distortions in the range of one to three 
percent in the cattle price paid by processors (Azzam and Schroeter 1991; Koontz, Garcia, and 
Hudson 1993; Azzam and Park 1993; Weliwita and Azzam 1996; Muth and Wolgenant 1999), 
suggesting that market power in beef packing had not increased appreciably over the intervening 
years. A more recent estimate of the suppression of cattle prices due to oligopsony power was, 
however, somewhat higher—in the range of 5 to 10 percent (Crespi and Sexton 2005).6  
The empirical literature on oligopsony power in the market for hogs is sparse relative to 
that for cattle and beef and is focused primarily on estimating farm-to-wholesale (FW) marketing 
margins, instead of market power parameters, and making inferences about competition based 
upon the behavior of margins. If, as concentration increased over time, packers were exercising 
increasing oligopsony power by reducing the price they paid for hogs, the FW margin would 
increase over time after controlling for other factors. However, this is not what has been 
observed. From 1970 to 1998, the real pork FW margin declined by 65% (USDA 2000). Brester 
and Marsh (2001) found that technological changes in meatpacking contributed to 
proportionately greater reductions in marketing margins and increases in real hog prices over 
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time—a one percent increase in meatpacker productivity was estimated to reduce the pork FW 
margin by 1.43 percent. 
This brief summary of empirical studies of buyer market power in U.S. agriculture is 
illustrative of the findings in the broader literature.7 The U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) recently conducted a thorough study on the issue and summarized the literature as 
follows: 
The empirical economic literature has not established that concentration in the 
processing segment of the beef, pork, or dairy sectors or the retail sector overall 
has adversely affected commodity or food prices. We reviewed 33 studies 
published since 1990 that were relevant to assessing the effect of concentration on 
commodity and food prices in these sectors.  Most of the studies that we reviewed 
either found no evidence of market power or found efficiency effects that were 
larger than the market power effects of concentration (GAO 2009, p. 3). 
 
What the empirical literature in meatpacking does strongly support, however, is the 
proposition that economies of size and consistent operation of plants at efficient capacity are 
essential forces driving processors’ procurement policies.8 Because these scale-related efficiency 
gains are based upon achieving consistent and optimal levels of throughput, packers must insure 
a steady supply of live animals to their plants. The efficient way to achieve this goal is likely to 
involve substantial vertical coordination, known in the industry as “captive supplies,” so that 
attainment of sufficient throughput essential to a plant’s profitable operation (and with the 
characteristics desired by the processor) is not left to the vagaries of spot-market competition. 
The GAO in its 2009 study also recognized the essential role of economies of size and stable 
flow of raw product, as did the comprehensive study of competition in the livestock sector 
coordinated by the Research Triangle Institute in response to a mandate to GIPSA contained in 
the 2002 Farm Bill: 
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Large processing plants achieved cost economies by ensuring a smooth and 
undisrupted flow of hogs so they could operate their plants at near full capacity. 
Therefore, their desire to continue purchasing hogs to achieve these cost savings 
could overwhelm any incentives to exercise market power by restricting 
purchases (GAO 2009). 
 
When both are operating close to capacity, smaller plants are at an absolute cost 
disadvantage compared to larger plants. When larger plants operate with smaller 
volumes, they have higher costs than smaller plants operating close to capacity 
and, thus, have incentive to increase throughput. For all plants, large and small, 
average total cost increases sharply as volumes are reduced (Muth et al. 2005, p. 
ES-6). 
 
 
A Unifying Framework 
Thus, the structural evolution of most agricultural markets reflects increasing concentration 
among processing and marketing firms; processing and packing plants that are highly capital 
intensive, geographically dispersed, and declining in numbers; and an increasingly vertically 
coordinated market chain, with contracts and (in some sectors) upstream vertical integration by 
processors replacing spot-market exchanges. Producer complaints about lack of selling 
opportunities are legion. Yet, empirical evidence of buyer market power in the traditional sense 
of firms restricting purchases to decrease the input price is scant. On the other hand empirical 
evidence strongly supports the importance of economies of scale and a stable supply of farm 
product with desired characteristics to the efficient operation of processing facilities and the 
successful marketing of finished products to downstream buyers.9 
 This evidence is readily reconciled if one steps back from the traditional short-run market 
power formulation and considers a long-run optimization framework (Sexton 2013, in press). An 
inevitable consequence of the exercise of traditional short-run buyer oligopsony power for a 
commodity is that prices received by farmers are depressed below the competitive level. 
Consistent suppression of farm prices in this manner will cause long-run returns to investment in 
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production of the commodity to fall below the so-called “normal” or competitive level, causing 
resources to exit the industry. If downstream buyers have extensive investments in assets that are 
committed to the specific industry (in the sense that they cannot be used for other products) and 
geographic location (in the sense that they cannot be moved), it is very likely not in the long-run 
interests of buyers for resources to exit production of the farm commodity in this setting because 
their exit will jeopardize returns on the buyers’ own investments which rely upon a secure and 
stable supply of farm product. 
 Rather, it would seem that the optimal strategy in these settings is to secure a stable 
supply of farm product input that is (a) produced efficiently (i.e., in a least-cost manner, given 
quality characteristics of the product), and (b) transacted efficiently. Contracts and upstream 
vertical integration come to the forefront as vertical exchange mechanisms conducive to locking 
in stable supplies and minimizing transactions costs.10 Spot or cash markets are likely to be 
regarded by both buyers and most sellers as an inferior alternative. Buyers will regard contracts 
as an inferior alternative to vertical integration the greater are the restrictions and limitations 
imposed on contracts through policies such as the proposed GIPSA regulations. 
 Following Sexton (2013, in press), we define the per-unit market surplus to a transaction 
between buyer i and seller j as Sij Vij  ci  cj  Tij , where Vij is the price of the finished product 
paid by consumers or intermediaries further downstream, ci and c j are per-unit variable costs of 
buyers and sellers respectively, and Tij is the transaction cost of exchange between i and j 
expressed on a per-unit basis. Vij is a function of the characteristics of the farm product produced 
by j. Sij thus defines the size of the pie that will be divided between i and j if they execute an 
exchange. A farmer’s payment, Pij  from transacting with buyer i can be expressed in terms of the 
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minimum amount required to call forth production, c j , plus a share, 0   1, of the market 
surplus: 
(1)  Pij  cj S ij . 
Buyers in any market period require a fixed amount of farm product input for any of the 
reasons mentioned earlier. We make no attempt here to specify a fully dynamic model that might 
enable an optimal procurement strategy to be derived analytically. Rather, we define what we 
consider to be the likely characteristics of exchange between farmers and downstream buyers in 
this setting: 
 Buyers will seek exchange mechanisms that elicit farm products with the 
characteristics they desire and that limit transactions costs. These goals are likely to 
be achieved best through contracts or vertical integration. 
 Buyers will seek to conduct exchange with the most efficient producers as a way to 
increase Sij . 
 Buyers will seek to satisfy their production needs by engaging relatively few 
suppliers so as to minimize transactions costs. 
 Among the group of suppliers a buyer engages, the buyer has incentive to offer a 
price that insures the long-run viability of those farming operations. This will be 
consistent with the buyer’s long-run optimization because it fosters a symbiotic 
relationship between the buyer and farms supplying it, thereby helping to insure the 
presence of a stable supply of farm product and limiting transactions costs of 
procuring the farm product. 
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This symbiotic relationship between buyer and seller can emerge only in settings when 
the buyer can internalize a sufficient amount of the benefit from fostering a stable supply of the 
farm product over the long run. Increasing concentration among buyers is critical to achieving 
this outcome. 11  Thus, it is fully consistent with the market framework set forth here for the 
exercise of buyer power to be inversely related to the market’s buyer concentration and degree of 
vertical coordination. 
The persistence over time of a mutually beneficial relationship between producers and a 
buyer depends upon the buyer maintaining a long-run optimization horizon. In other words if the 
buyer encounters a situation when the future is discounted heavily, e.g., due to severe financial 
stress, then the buyer’s optimum can revert to the short-run optimum and exercise of any market 
power at the buyer’s disposal.12 An extreme manifestation of such buyer power is what is known 
as the “holdup problem.” (Goldberg 1976). A producer who commits to acquiring assets specific 
to a particular buyer (as is the typical case with broiler contracts, among others) is vulnerable in 
any period to a contract renegotiation on less favorable terms than the original agreement. The 
long-run costs to buyers who exploit such short-run power, however, rules out its use in all but 
extreme circumstances of buyer financial distress. 
Some policy makers are apt to view aspects of this type of market equilibrium as 
undesirable. In particular, it is very difficult for small producers to compete for contracts in this 
environment. In a scale intensive agriculture, small producers are likely to be less cost efficient 
than their larger rivals, therefore requiring a higher Pij to remain viable in the long run. 
Transaction costs of dealing with many small farmers will be higher than the associated costs of 
dealing with a few large farmers, and small farmers may also be less effective than larger 
counterparts in producing the quality characteristics needed to maximize Vij . Thus, the concerns 
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expressed by Undersecretary Avalos in justifying the USDA’s support for the GIPSA regulations 
would be unresolved in these settings. 
The emerging trends among some consumes to demand additional credence-type 
attributes in their foods, such as locally produced, sustainably produced, humanely produced, and 
fairly traded products, may in the short-run provide a sanctuary for small-scale producers who 
can target these niches in an effective manner. The problem is that, as these niches grow, the 
additional volumes transacted create opportunities for larger operations to exploit the scale 
economies that seem inevitable regardless of the product or its specific attributes. The need for 
vertical coordination to insure consistent supply of these emerging product attributes is also 
apparent. Thus, the opportunities for small-scale producers can give way quickly in these settings, 
as appears increasingly to be true for organic production, as illustrated in the words of Colorado 
organic rancher Armando Valdez: 
My experience working with some of these retailers, especially the organic 
natural markets, if you're a smaller rancher or producer, it's much more difficult. 
Unless you come with 200 head, they don't even want to talk to you…. We tried 
to market to Whole Foods in the past, and they told us we just don't have the 
numbers. And I don't consider myself a small, small producer. We have 300 head 
of cattle. And they still wanted more (Livestock Industry Workshop 2010, 174: 4-
15). 
 
What Does Market Power Mean in Coordinated Markets and How Do We Measure It? 
In the NEIO framework buyer market power is measured by a parameter, often designated as  , 
that ranges on a scale from zero (perfect competition) to one (pure monopsony) based upon 
observation of the extent to which the farm price is depressed below the value of its marginal 
product, i.e., below the value of buyers’ input demand function. Production of the farm product, 
thus, is also depressed below the competitive level. Under the theory of behavior in coordinated 
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markets that has been sketched here market power measured according to the NEIO framework 
will be near zero, as, of course, has most often been the case. 
 An alternative measure of “market power” presents itself within the vertically 
coordinated market framework based upon the division of the market surplus between farmers 
and downstream buyers. This is measured by the value of  in equation (1), where like the NEIO 
 ,   ranges on the unit interval. Important to define is the particular value of  , say  * , such 
that the farming operation earns at least the normal return on investment that is sufficient to 
sustain the resources in production in the long run. In principle,  * could be given a j subscript 
because its value will differ among heterogeneous farmers. However, putting aside this 
complication, the theory sketched here is that in settings when the coordinated, symbiotic 
procurement markets are able to emerge the minimum value of  that will be observed is  * . 
 Indeed, observed deviations from  * would be rare within the fully vertically coordinated 
market chain described here. We have already described instances when   * and 
even converging upon zero could be observed. The converse case of   *would emerge in 
the face of severe demand or supply shocks that were sufficient to disrupt the vertically 
coordinated equilibrium. For example, a severe negative shock in supply could cause buyers who 
would not ordinarily solicit purchases outside of a designated group of suppliers to compete 
aggressively to secure the patronage of geographically distant producers who are supplying other 
buyers. A significant positive demand shock could precipitate similar behavior. 
 Empirical estimation of the NEIO   faces some daunting econometric challenges 
(Perloff, Golan, Karp 2007), but on the data side the requirements are to have sufficient data be 
able to estimate the demand for the farm product input and the farm supply function. Because the 
demand for the farm product will not be directly observed in the price and quantity data if buyers 
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exercise oligopsony power, some knowledge of or ability to estimate buyers’ variable costs and 
thereby to derive farm demand from a downstream demand that is estimable will also typically 
be needed. Estimating  would require data on farm prices, prices received downstream by 
buyers, farmers’ and buyers’ variable costs, and transactions costs. Recognizing the close link 
between farm variable costs and farm supply curves, the data required to estimate  and  are, 
thus, very similar, with the omission of transactions costs from the NEIO model because it is 
fundamentally a spot-market model wherein the role of transactions costs is typically ignored. 
 
Evaluation of Policies to Regulate Vertical Coordination in Agricultural Markets 
Various legislation currently before the U.S. Congress and being considered for inclusion in the 
2012 Farm Bill is intended to limit buyers’ ability to use specific means of vertical coordination 
and to push them in the direction of utilizing spot markets for farm-product acquisition. 
Evaluated in the light of the analysis presented in this paper, these policies could, if enacted, 
work quite opposite of what proponents intend and be detrimental to farmer welfare.  
Such efforts are problematic in multiple dimensions. First and most widely understood 
among economists is that foreclosing vertical coordination options will be detrimental to the 
efficient operation of markets, reducing the overall surplus generated in them.13 Under a standard 
perfect competition or short-run market power model, such an effect would, ceteris paribus, raise 
costs, reduce volumes traded, raise final product prices to consumers, and reduce prices paid to 
farmers for the raw product input. Even if they conceded the efficiency gains associated with 
vertical coordination, proponents interested primarily in the distribution of returns to farmers 
could well claim the policies would benefit farmers on net if they reduced processors’ market 
power in procurement by compelling greater activity and, hence, greater competition in the cash 
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market. Although the overall pie may have shrunk, farmers would receive a larger share of it. 
Similarly smaller farmers might face a more level playing field if transactions were concentrated 
in the cash market. 
Our analysis suggests, however, that such logic is flawed. Although contracts are 
certainly not without coordination problems themselves (Wu and Roe 2007, Wu 2010), in a cash 
market with arm’s-length transactions no long-run symbiotic relationship between buyers and 
sellers can be fostered. The optimal strategy for buyers in these settings is to exercise whatever 
short-run market power they possess, and, given the structural oligopsony character of the typical 
farm product procurement market, the impacts of that market power, particularly for the 
distribution of market returns, can be significant. Indeed this is a fundamental point that emerges 
from a series of papers that apply a short-run oligopoly-oligopsony model to agricultural 
markets—although the market efficiency (deadweight loss) impact of moderate oligopsony 
power is small, the distributional impact is much greater, enabling intermediaries to capture 
much larger shares of the surplus generated in a market than they would under perfect 
competition.14 Thus, the irony is that, relative to vertical coordination, spot transactions are more 
likely to expose sellers to buyer oligopsony power, the very outcome proponents seek to avoid. 
Interest in how packers acquire livestock and attempts to limit packer ownership are 
longstanding (Saitone and Sexton 2012). Policymakers have been promoting legislation to 
influence farm product procurement markets in livestock in three key dimensions: limitations on 
packer ownership of live animals, requiring minimum spot market purchases, and regulating 
contractual provisions. Despite the clear efficiency incentives for vertical coordination, including 
packer ownership, in livestock procurement, proponents of prohibiting packer ownership claim 
that such a policy would increase packer procurement via spot market transactions. This 
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argument seems clearly to be flawed because the next best alternative to the vertical coordination 
sought through ownership would not be spot markets but, rather, procurement through contracts. 
Recognizing this fact, legislation has also been proposed to mandate a minimum level of packer 
purchases via spot market transactions (e.g., HR 5247 and S. 460). Although regulation of packer 
procurement methods is not at this time part of the 2012 Farm Bill, legislation surrounding 
packer ownership is still being debated.  
While many versions of such legislation have been promulgated, the most recent version 
brought before the Senate in February 2012 (S. 2141) seeks to amend the Packers and Stockyards 
Act to make it unlawful for a packer to own, feed, or control livestock intended for slaughter 
more than 7 days prior to slaughter.15 In addition, Senators Grassley (R Iowa) and Conrad (D 
North Dakota) have introduced an amendment to include the content of S. 2141 as part of the 
2012 Farm Bill during the Senate’s Farm Bill debate.  
As contract exchange has assumed increasing importance in U.S. agriculture, increasing 
attention has been given to proposals to regulate contract provisions.16 The 2008 Farm Bill 
mandated the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations to establish criteria for what 
constitutes “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage” under the Packers and Stockyards 
Act.17 In June 2010, GIPSA responded with a broad and aggressive regulatory proposal that, as 
noted, was subject to extensive debate and commentary. Although Congress effectively stripped 
the majority of content from the proposed regulations by not providing funding, the debate over 
regulation of contractual provisions continues. 18   
Among the most contentious provisions in the proposed GIPSA regulations were those 
specifying permissible contract terms. The proposed regulations prohibited packers from 
applying a premium or discount to the purchase price of livestock without offering a 
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revenue/cost justification associated with the adjustment (GIPSA 2010, §201.210(a)5). In 
addition, they specified that processors must maintain records of justifications for differential 
prices paid and augmentations made to standard contracts offered to producers (GIPSA 2010, 
§201.94b). 
Although these proposed regulations were not enacted due to Congress’s intervention, 
recent attempts to influence the contracting structure in the livestock industry have been made 
through stand-alone legislation. Identical bills introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 
2631) and in the Senate (S. 1026) would amend the Packers and Stockyards Act to prohibit 
“anticompetitive” forward contracts.  Such contracts are defined as those that lack a firm base 
price, are not offered for open public bid, determine price based upon a formula, or provide for 
the sale of more than 40 cattle or 30 swine. 
In essence, these various provisions to restrict contracts attempt to create a spot market 
for contracts. By requiring uniformity in the provisions, limiting the number of animals that can 
be transacted, and requiring an open bidding process proponents hope to create a level playing 
field for small producers and to incite aggressive bidding among buyers and sellers for contracts, 
i.e., a spot market. 
The flaws in this logic are by now probably sufficiently apparent that little more need be 
said. A spot market, whether it is for the direct exchange of cattle or for a contract to exchange 
cattle, incentivizes buyers to exercise any short-run oligopsony power they can because the 
detrimental impact on future supplies of such market power is largely an externality (see footnote 
11). Uniformity and public bidding for contracts would specifically prevent the long-run 
symbiotic relationships between buyers and sellers from emerging, and these are the 
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relationships that we argue give farmers the best opportunity in modern agricultural markets to 
earn at least a competitive return on their investments. 
Such regulations would also increase the transactions costs of exchange relative to the 
status quo, and some portion of those higher costs would surely be transferred to producers 
through lower prices. Indeed, the growing demand for locally produced, identity preserved, 
organic and other recently popular production systems that now need large and consistent 
supplies would be harmed by legislation forcing buyers to eschew contracts that more readily 
control the attributes that flow “from farm to fork,” as such advocates of these products desire.  
Finally, as Saitone and Sexton (2012) note, regulations that prohibit or discourage (through 
incentivizing lawsuits) the use of premiums and discounts in contracts discourage the production 
of differentiated and high-quality products that are essential to producers’ and marketers’ success 
in modern agricultural markets. 
In contrast to the policies being contemplated now that deter beneficial long-run 
relationships from emerging, beneficial policies can facilitate their emergence. For example, 
many producers are suspicious of contractual arrangements that specify premiums and discounts 
that are ultimately subject to determination by the processor. Third-party inspections and 
certification, whether by government or industry marketing orders, could allay such concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
Although this discussion has focused on the U.S. and the livestock sector in particular, the trends 
described herein and the increasing need for vertical coordination between producers and market 
intermediaries are rather ubiquitous across the developed and developing world and across most 
agricultural industries. The developments have happened first and faster in livestock than 
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elsewhere and, thus, livestock has been the focal point for both research and policy proposals 
pertaining to concentration and vertical coordination. 
 The developments discussed herein have been precipitated both by technological 
advancements in farm production and processing and by key trends in consumer demands for 
food. We see neither of these factors abating but, rather, the likelihood is that they proceed apace 
or accelerate. Certainly the advancement of technology seems inexorable, and it occurs with a 
bias towards capital- and scale-intensive processes. On the processing side this translates into 
fewer and larger facilities and facilities with little flexibility to efficiently handle fluctuating 
levels of throughput. On the production side it points to continued efficiency advantages for 
larger farmers, making them the desirable trading partners in a coordinated agriculture. The trend 
among consumers to demand an ever wider set of characteristics in the food they consume is in 
our view the product of both increasing incomes and declining food budget shares and an 
increasing social awareness among consumers, neither of which is likely to abate over time. 
 Consumers are the big winners in vertically coordinated modern agricultural markets. 
They get access to an incredibly wide range of products reflective of their increasingly diverse 
tastes at low cost. The less efficient producers and intermediaries are the big losers. The market 
is never kind to inefficient operators, but in the past small farms could hang on in essence by 
undervaluing family labor, “consuming” the amenities of rural living, and selling into cash 
markets. In a vertically coordinated agriculture, such producers increasingly have trouble finding 
selling opportunities. 
 What can and should be done about these developments are difficult questions. Policies 
that attempt to put the brakes on these trends are misguided in our view because they detract 
from the efficiency of the market and make U.S. agriculture less competitive in the world. The 
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start to producing good policies is for policymakers and the agricultural economists whose 
research is input to the policy process to recognize that modern agricultural markets are not the 
quintessential open markets of days past and, moreover, never will be again. Research 
underpinned by such models is unlikely to be helpful, and policies tailored to such markets or 
intended to turn the tide back in their direction are likely to be counterproductive.  
 
Endnotes 
																																																								
1 The HHI is the sum of every firm’s squared share of market value in an industry.  Consider an 
example.  Two industries, A and B, are each composed of five firms.  Industry A’s firms have 
the following percentage market shares: 50, 20, 10, 10, and 10, resulting in an HHI of 3,200.  
The five firms in industry B have percentage shares of 30, 20, 20, 20, and 10, resulting in an HHI 
of 2,200.  The CR4 for both industries is 90 percent, but the higher HHI in industry A reflects the 
very large share of one of its firms.   
2 We emphasize that the national data and the NAICS industry classifications may not be deemed 
relevant markets for antitrust analysis in either product- or geographic-market contexts. 
3  Code 311312, cane sugar refining, has a reported CR4 of 95.2, suggesting its unreported HHI 
may be very high. 
4 This definitely seems to be true for steer and heifer processing where on Oct. 20, 2008, the DOJ 
filed a case alleging that the proposed acquisition by Brazilian cattle processor JBS of National 
Beef Packing Company would likely lessen competition in the purchase of fed cattle and in the 
sale of USDA-graded boxed beef to retailers. The parties subsequently abandoned the transaction. 
5 These concerns are reflected in two similar class action lawsuits filed on behalf of dairy farmer 
plaintiffs alleging that their cooperatives were colluding with processors in order to acquire or 
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maintain monopsony power in the market for the acquisition of raw fluid milk. Defendants and 
co-conspirators were alleged to have refused to purchase milk from independent dairy farmers, 
effectively forcing them to join a cooperative or a marketing services organization or have no 
buyer in the relevant geographic market for their milk (Sweetwater Valley Farm, Inc. et al. v. 
Dean Foods Company et al. 2008).   
 
6 The difference in the magnitude of the markdown estimates obtained in this study relative to 
predecessors may be due to a number of factors including its use of transactional-level data, 
analysis of a relatively small time period and specific geographic area, the use of an alternative 
method of oligopsony-power estimation, as well as simply the period of the data collection as 
discussed in Crespi, Xia, and Jones (2010).   
7 Most of the work on buyer power in agriculture has examined the meat packing industry but the 
studies available for other industries suggest that only modest buyer power exists in them as well. 
See for example Katchova, Sheldon and Miranda (2005) on potato procurement and Crespi, Gao 
and Hanawa Peterson (2005) on rice procurement. 
8See for example studies by Hayenga (1998), McDonald et al. (2000), McDonald and Ollinger 
(2000), Morrison-Paul (2001), Ward (2002), and Muth et al. (2005). 
9 This latter point relates to the imperative in modern agricultural markets that a seller be able to 
reliably supply a consistent amount of product to its downstream buyers (Sexton 2013, in press). 
10 This linkage between the existence of highly specific assets for both farmers and processors 
and the transactions-cost benefits of vertical coordination is fully consistent with the views 
articulated by Williamson, one of the pioneers of transactions-cost economics. For example, 
Williamson (1986, p. 157) writes “the main factor that is responsible for vertical integration from 
	 30
																																																																																																																																																																																		
a transaction-cost point of view is asset specificity.” For discussions on the links between 
transactions costs and vertical coordination in agricultural markets see Murrell (1983), Goodhue 
(1999), Hueth and Hennessy (2001), and Martinez (2002).  
11 This point is best seen by imagining a converse situation involving moderate oligopsony 
power among five equal-sized Cournot competitors. These buyers each have a rather signifcant 
short-run market power, especially given that the farm supply they face is highly inelastic. Full 
exercise of this oligopsony power will diminish return on farm investment and over time lead to 
exit. A buyer who chooses to preserve resources in the production sector by paying a price 
sufficient to generate at least a competitive return on farm investment internalizes only 20 
percent of the benefit from her investment in long-run viability of farm production. 
12  This argument is fundamentally no different than the argument that cartels (cooperative 
agreements among sellers) tend to breakdown during periods of financial stress because the long-
run benefits of abiding by a cartel agreement are dominated by the short-run gains from cheating 
on it (e.g., Levenstein and Suslow 2006).  A contemporary example of breakdown of a 
cooperative agreement between a buyer and its suppliers might be the case of Adams, et al. v. 
Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (Civil Action No. 2:09-CV-397. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, September 30, 2011), where the judge ruled that the defendant shuttered a processing 
facility, leaving contract growers without a market outlet, in an attempt to stem the decline in 
prices for processed chicken. 
13 The magnitude of efficiency gains from contract production can be large depending upon the 
particular market configuration. The hog market has created something of a natural experiment 
in this regard, given the rapid evolution of vertical coordination mechanisms in that industry. 
Key and McBride (2003) for example found efficiency gains to contract production of hogs 
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relative to arm’s length spot exchange on the order of 20 percent. Wohlgenant (2010) found that 
inefficiencies created by banning packer ownership of hogs would reduce farm prices on the 
order of seven percent. 
14 See for example Alston, Sexton, and Zhang (1997), Sexton et al. (2007), and Saitone, Sexton, 
and Sexton (2008) for demonstrations of this point in the contexts of returns to farm research, 
impacts of trade liberalization, and distribution of benefits from the ethanol tax credit, 
respectively. 
15 S. 2141 would affect packers who slaughter more than 120,000 head per year and exempts 
cooperatives or entities owned by cooperatives from compliance. 
16  McCorriston and Sheldon (1997) and McCorriston (2002) discuss vertical restraint and 
contracting issues outside of the U.S. 
17 The 2008 Farm Bill also stipulated that the Secretary must establish criteria to determine 
whether “a live poultry dealer has provided reasonable notice to poultry growers of any 
suspension of delivery of birds under a poultry-growing arrangement,” “when a requirement of 
additional capital investments over the life of a poultry growing arrangement or swine 
production contract constitutes a violation of the Act,” and “if a live poultry dealer or swine 
contractor has provided a reasonable period of time for a poultry grower or swine production 
contract grower to remedy breach of contract that could lead to termination of the poultry 
growing arrangement or swine production contract.” 
18 The House of Representatives’ version of the 2012 Farm Bill (H.R. 6083) includes a provision 
to repeal the portions of the GIPSA regulations that were put into place February 7, 2012.  
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Table 1. Structural characteristics of agricultural procurement 
1.  The products are often bulky and/or perishable, causing shipping costs to be high, restricting 
the products' geographic mobility, and limiting farmers' access to only those buyers located 
close to the production site.  
2. Processors' needs for agricultural products are highly specialized. Other inputs cannot 
normally be substituted for a given farm product, nor can the given farm product substitute 
readily for agricultural product inputs in alternative production processes.  
3. Farmers are specialized to the supply of particular commodities through extensive investments 
in sunk assets. These assets represent exit barriers for farmers and cause raw product supply to 
be inelastic.  
4. Marketing cooperatives or bargaining associations, institutions of seller power, are present or 
potentially present in the market. 
Source: Rogers and Sexton (1994) 
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Table 2. 2007 Values and changes since 1997 in 6-digit NAICS industry sales and 
concentration 
Code Industry  Firms  Sales CR4 HHI Firms Sales CR4 HHI 
  2007 Values 1997-2007 Change 
   (no.)  ($ bill.) (%) (val.) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
311111  Dog and cat food manufacturing         199       14.5 71    2,325 54 67 22 84 
311119  Other animal food manufacturing         993       24.7 30.1       285 3 30 27 19 
311211  Flour milling         172          9.8 54.5       831 -32 23 13 19 
311212  Rice milling           58          2.8 45.6       776 4 20 -12 -13 
311213  Malt manufacturing           17          0.8 73.2    1,536 -11 2 6 5 
311221  Wet corn milling           33       12.0 83.8    2,338 10 42 17 55 
311222  Soybean processing           68       19.3 81.5    1,931 58 37 2 -5 
311223  Other oilseed processing           31          1.8 79.5    2,753 -3 4 19 28 
311225  Fats and oils refining and blending          75       13.4 54.4    1,030 -18 75 48 71 
311230  Breakfast cereal manufacturing           35          9.9 80.4    2,426 -27 8 -3 -1 
311311  Sugarcane mills           16          1.9 66.1    1,428 -53 28 17 23 
311312  Cane sugar refining           14          2.3 95.2  D 17 -28 -4 D 
311313  Beet sugar manufacturing           12          3.2 81.5    2,259 50 18 -4 13 
311320 
 
 Chocolate and confectionery  
manufacturing from cacao beans         154          4.4 59.1    1,276 1 18 -26 -50 
311330 
 
 Confectionery manufacturing  
from purchased chocolate     1,050          9.7 63    1,548 32 24 -3 -3 
311340 
 Nonchocolate confectionery  
manufacturing         411          5.7 38.2       501 -29 13 -6 -20 
311411 
 Frozen fruit, juice, and vegetable  
manufacturing         148       10.7 41.1       587 -16 12 20 32 
311412 
 
 Frozen specialty food  
manufacturing         360       14.3 29.4       374 -1 41 -27 -29 
311421  Fruit and vegetable canning         537       21.0 24.4       255 -19 33 -2 -2 
311422  Specialty canning         101          9.1 75.9    2,885 -17 13 13 33 
311423 
 
 Dried and dehydrated food  
manufacturing         150          5.6 35.9       486 20 81 18 10 
311511  Fluid milk manufacturing         280       33.5 46    1,075 -30 53 116 426 
311512  Creamery butter manufacturing           23          2.1 78.9    2,283 -28 57 51 157 
311513  Cheese manufacturing         341       33.2 31.5       379 -15 64 -9 -28 
311514 
 
 Dry, condensed, and evaporated  
dairy product manufacturing         141       13.9 42       652 -17 51 -11 -20 
continued. 
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Table 2. 2007 Values and changes since 1997 in 6-digit NAICS industry sales and 
concentration-continued 
Code Industry  Firms  Value CR4 HHI Firms Value CR4 HHI 
  2007 Values 1997-2007 Change 
     (no.)  ($ bill.)  (%)  (val.)  (%)   (%)  (%)  (%) 
311520 
 
 Ice cream and frozen  
dessert manufacturing         347          8.8 52.7 
  
954 -15 51 63 115 
311611 
 
 Animal (except poultry)  
slaughtering     1,523         68.9 59.4 
  
1,047 17 27 4 -2 
311612  Meat processed from carcasses     1,237         37.2 27.9    258 6 53 37 50 
311613 
 
 Rendering and meat  
byproduct processing         128 
  
3.7 42.8 
  
646 -7 44 14 13 
311615  Poultry processing         324       50.2 45.7    738 26 58 13 10 
311711  Seafood canning           83          1.0 58.1 1,255 -45 20 124 266 
311712 
 
 Fresh and frozen seafood  
processing         481         10.0 28.3 
  
319 -18 66 108 165 
311811  Retail bakeries     6,101           3.4 3.7        7 -12 74 48 97 
311812  Commercial bakeries     2,297         26.0 37.3    451 -4 21 -5 -24 
311813 
 
 Frozen cakes, pies, and  
other pastries manufacturing         206 
  
4.9 32.4 
  
407 -8 97 -15 -26 
311821 
 
 Cookie and cracker 
manufacturing         303         10.8 69.3 
  
1,607 -6 9 16 16 
311822 
 
 
 Flour mixes and dough  
manufacturing from purchased 
flour         240           6.3 35.1 
  
553 17 26 -20 -47 
311823  Dry pasta manufacturing         155          1.5 62.9 1,210 -38 -13 10 -8 
311830  Tortilla manufacturing         329           2.6 57.4 1,865 52 133 0 1 
311911 
 
 Roasted nuts and peanut  
butter manufacturing         188           6.8 33.5 
  
413 47 73 -11 -25 
311919  Other snack food manufacturing         286         17.5 D  D -16 81 D D 
311920  Coffee and tea manufacturing         337          7.8 43.3    763 57 -2 -18 -26 
311930 
 
 Flavoring syrup and  
concentrate manufacturing         150           9.2 D  D 1 39 D D 
311941 
 
 
 Mayonnaise, dressing,  
and other prepared sauce  
manufacturing         282           6.8 36.2 
  
483 -4 17 -10 -26 
311942  Spice and extract manufacturing         308           7.5 29.6    480 28 77 -32 -40 
311991 
 
 Perishable prepared food  
manufacturing         612          8.3 27.8 
  
273 47 204 14 21 
311999 
 
 All other miscellaneous  
food manufacturing         759         10.8 18.7 
  
168 -3 35 -20 -24 
 Average        470         12.5 50.3 1,048 1 42 13 30 
 Min          12           0.8 3.7      7 -53 -28 -32 -50 
 Max    6,101         68.9 95.2 2,885 58 204 124 426 
  Median        206          9.1 45.7   770 -4 35 6 8 
Notes.  D denotes an unreported value.  For 2007, the CR8 for codes 311919 (other snack food) and 311930 
(flavorings) were 77 and 84.4, respectively. CR4 is the four-firm concentration ratio.  HHI is the Herfindahl index. 
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Table 3. Four-firm concentration ratio for selected meat packing industries, 1980-2010 
Year Steer & Heifer Sheep & Lamb Hog Broiler Turkey 
1980 36 56 34 32* 40* 
1995 81 72 46 46 45 
2000 81 67 56 49 41 
2001 80 66 57 48 55 
2002 79 65 55 48 54 
2003 80 65 64 55 54 
2004 79 65 64 54 55 
2005 80 70 64 53 54 
2006 81 68 61 58 56 
2007 80 70 65 57 51 
2008 79 70 65 57 51 
2009 81 70 63 53 58 
2010 85 65 65 51 56 
Percent Change 1980-2010 136% 16% 91% 59% 40% 
Percent Change 1980-1995 125% 29% 35% 44% 13% 
Percent Change 1995-2010 5% -10% 41% 11% 24% 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, the source is Packers & Stockyards Program Annual Report, various years.  
* indicates the 1982 value from Ollinger et al. (2000), as poultry is unreported in earlier packers and stockyards 
reports.  
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Table 4. Number of meat packing plants, 1980-2010 
Year Cattle Sheep & Lamb Hog 
1980 743 195 509 
1995 279 98 245 
2000 190 62 185 
2001 190 65 185 
2002 170 55 175 
2003 165 56 155 
2004 175 57 165 
2005 170 58 162 
2006 165 55 160 
2007 165 57 165 
2008 135 52 125 
2009 135 53 135 
2010 135 59 130 
Percent Change 1980-2010 -82% -70% -74% 
Percent Change 1980-1995 -62% -50% -52% 
Percent Change 1995-2010 -29% -5% -30% 
Source: 1980 data are from the Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report (October 1996). 1995 data are from 
Packers & Stockyards Program (P&SP) 1995 Annual Report. In later years P&SP converted to graphical reporting 
only.  2000-2010 values are approximations from P&SP’s graphical reporting in the P&SP 2011 Annual Report. 
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